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Representation

Electoral systems determine which groups of voters are able to secure representation—and how much. A key driver of this working group’s interest in proportional representation (and, likewise, the OCP recommendation of STV) is its potential for improved representation on a variety of dimensions.
 

i. Party and Ideological Representation

Single-member districts tend to overrepresent groups already in the majority and underrepresent those in a minority. To illustrate, consider Massachusetts, where Republicans do not constitute a majority in any given district—they are too geographically dispersed—and so Democrats win the single U.S. House seat available in each district. The cumulative effect is an all-blue delegation. Despite constituting one-third of the entire state’s electorate, Republicans are unable to secure any of the delegation’s nine seats. Republicans’ one-third vote share translates into a zero percent seat share, while Democrats’ two-third vote share translates into 100 percent of seats.49

Lopsided House delegations are common. Those from Arkansas, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Utah, for example, are composed of only a single party, despite at least one-third of each of their electorates voting for the opposing party. In Oklahoma, where roughly one-third of the state votes Democratic in congressional elections, all five House seats are held by Republicans.

Typically, these nonproportional outcomes are not the result of gerrymandering. In California, for example, where gerrymandering has been virtually eliminated, Democrats currently hold 77 percent of congressional seats despite earning less than 60 percent of the vote.50 In Massachusetts, district lines are slightly biased toward Republicans, who still cannot secure a single seat.51 Instead, these outcomes are a consequence of single-member districts, which are uniquely sensitive to the geographic distribution of voters: in no Oklahoman district are Democrats concentrated enough to constitute a majority.

Finally, proportional systems, because of their use of multimember districts, create space for more political parties to form and effectively compete. Proportional systems vary widely in their number of parties, principally due to different district magnitudes and assembly sizes.52 But in general, proportional systems generate multiparty systems. Multipartyism can provide for more multidimensional representation, with more voters able to identify and affiliate with a party that represents their interests.53 Instead of sorting the electorate into just one of two camps, multiparty systems permit voters expanded options that can more accurately reflect their preferences.

In the current two-party system, voters who do not believe that either party adequately represents their interests rarely have a viable alternative from which to choose. During this most recent national election, nearly 90 million eligible voters abstained. By contrast, 77 million voted for Donald Trump and 74 million for Kamala Harris. That is, more eligible voters opted out of participation than voted for either the Democratic or Republican candidate. Today, 70 percent of Americans feel that neither major party adequately represents them and wish they had more options to choose from.54 Proportional systems, in comparison, have higher turnout because voters are more likely to believe their vote matters, races are more likely to be competitive, and campaigns are more likely to engage in direct outreach to minority populations that are ignored under a winner-take-all scheme.55
 

ii. Race and Representation

The nonproportional results of winner-take-all similarly affect racial minorities. In South Carolina, Black voters constitute one-quarter of the electorate yet succeed in electing only a single candidate of their choice among the state’s seven-seat House delegation. A roughly one-quarter vote share translates into a one-seventh seat share. The single seat afforded to this voter group is made possible by South Carolina’s single majority-minority district, or a district with lines deliberately drawn to ensure a statewide minority can elect a candidate of choice in a district. Otherwise, Black voters in South Carolina would likely secure no representation in the seven-member delegation—despite accounting for one of every four voters.56

As political scientists Miriam Hänni and Thomas Saalfeld contend, “electoral systems are probably the most important determinants for the representation of ethno-national minority groups.”57 As a general principle, they observe, “proportional electoral rules . . . facilitate the representation of an ethnic minority, whereas majoritarian [winner-take-all] rules restrict . . . and exclude smaller groups.”58 Despite various important exceptions, cross-national evidence largely supports this observation.59 One global study of electoral systems and their relationship to minority representation finds that winner-take-all systems are “predisposed to exclude minorities from power, even if the minority’s concentration allows them to win some single-member seats.”60

More specifically, district magnitude—as the principal lever regulating the proportionality of outcomes—is a useful predictor; minority groups tend to be better able to secure representation as the number of seats per district increases.61 Additionally, as district magnitude increases, more parties, including major parties, nominate minority candidates “on the basis that balanced tickets will increase their electoral chances.”62 As one study comparing elections across various U.S. cities as well as Australia, Ireland, and the Netherlands found, higher district magnitudes correspond to “larger numbers of parties seating candidates of color.”63 Given that single-member districts represent the lowest possible district magnitude for an electoral system, they present an especially challenging avenue for minorities to secure representation commensurate with their vote share.

In the United States, research from the implementation of more proportional systems in lieu of winner-take-all at the municipal level reflects these trends. In a review of thirty races conducted throughout the 1990s using semiproportional systems in locations where Black voters were the predominant group and winner-take-all had previously been used, researchers found that Black candidates won at least one seat in 97 percent of races they contested, whereas previously not a single Black candidate had won.64 In Illinois, the only state to have employed a proportional alternative (doing so for over a century) for its state legislature, both partisan and racial minorities secured seats more commensurate with their votes than they had prior to its implementation.65

Modeling exercises suggest that proportional representation could generate similar effects on racial representation for U.S. House elections. One 2022 study concludes that, in states with three or more representatives, a proportional system for House elections could enable racial and ethnic minority populations to elect preferred candidates in close proportion to their share of the electorate—and that “race-conscious line-drawing . . . does not make any appreciable difference in the modeled outcomes.”66
 

iii. Women and Representation

Comparative research finds two major implications of proportional systems for women’s representation: the shift to proportional representation can lift the number of women who turn out to vote, and more women are elected in proportional systems.67 Regarding turnout, one recent study found that earlier shifts from winner-take-all to proportional representation increased the turnout of women in previously uncompetitive districts.68

Regarding the impact on the number and proportion of women who are elected to legislatures, the effects of proportional representation systems is harder to separate from another characteristic in the comparative research: many proportional democracies incorporate some form of gender quota, either at the party nomination stage or the general election stage.69

Indications from the broader scholarship on electoral systems point to how proportional representation of the type recommended in OCP (and used without quotas) could lead to improved representation for women.70 One area for further consideration includes understanding how proportional representation may shift candidates away from “zero sum” approaches to electoral competition. These changes may in turn alter perceptions of what running for office entails, thus reducing the barriers to women who run for office and increasing the “supply” of women candidates.71 The entry of more women into politics may, in turn, indirectly change gendered notions of leadership. Continuing research in this area will be crucial for understanding the potential impacts of shifting to STV at the congressional level in the United States.

The mechanisms through which proportional systems create the various effects discussed here vary widely, and some of those mechanisms may be more or less likely to be replicated in the United States.72 In the case of the election of women, comparative evidence identifies gender quotas as an important factor and, as noted above, changing perceptions of campaigning may also play a role. In the case of racial and ethnic representation, the key difference is that proportional systems allow for the representation of 5 percent, 10 percent, or 20 percent of an electorate spread over a broad geographic area in a way that does not occur in winner-take-all systems. The increased number of legislators from racial and ethnic minorities may also be facilitated in part through the formation of parties based on racial or ethnic identity. That is, the context (really) matters. In the United States, the specific experiences of race and gender and the broader rules governing elections and how discrimination is combatted (or enabled) through state and federal legislation may be different from experiences abroad. As a result, while the comparative data indicate the general direction of how proportional representation can have certain impacts and why, its practice in the United States will still be bounded by U.S. customs, laws, and experiences.

Polarization

While scholars do not agree on an ideal electoral system, “a strong scholarly consensus” holds that winner-take-all systems are “clearly not advisable” in societies characterized by deep divisions.79 Numerous studies find that winner-take-all systems tend to exacerbate existing social divisions in polarized socie­ties.80 Various studies also find that more proportional systems tend to perform better at accommodating diverse interests in different kinds of countries—and ultimately, according to some studies, at maintaining democratic governance.81 Political scientists have often recommended proportional systems for diverse societies that may be prone to ethnic conflict.82

One of the key concerns in the United States today is high levels of affective polarization, or the degree to which those with different partisan identities dislike one another rather than just disagree with one another. This is bad for healthy constitutional democracies because it makes it difficult for those with opposing views to find common ground and solve problems together. It reduces the trust that citizens have in one another and in their institutions and can even lead to political violence.

AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION: the degree to which those with different partisan identities dislike one another rather than just disagree with one another.

Recent comparative research has helped to draw more conclusive links between electoral system types and this kind of pernicious partisanship. One study of nineteen Western democracies found that winner-take-all systems “are associated with partisans’ more negative feelings toward opposing parties,” while “proportional systems are associated with positive partisan affect.”83 According to another study (of thirty-six countries), while identity-based polarization “is increasingly challenging democracies across the world,” those with proportional systems are associated with lower levels of it and “tend to do better at coping with [it].”84 In an assessment of eleven countries experiencing what the researchers term “pernicious polarization,” in which the public is divided into two mutually distrustful camps, “the most extreme cases . . . emerge in contexts of majoritarian [winner-take-all] electoral systems.”85

The relationship between electoral system type and polarization may be explained by how different electoral systems structure political conflict—and, in particular, by how they shape a country’s party system.86 Winner-take-all systems tend to generate predominantly two-party systems that more easily create an “us versus them” approach to conflict.87 Two-party systems—of which the United States is arguably the world’s strictest—in practice can divide an electorate into two camps that continually vie for power and where there is a consistent “other side.”88 As one scholar summarizes, “the more binary the party system, the stronger the outparty hatred.”89

Two-party systems may not inherently generate dangerous levels of polarization—the United States has experienced periods of less polarized politics than the present despite having a predominantly two-party system. Instead, “the rigid, binary choice of parties makes it much harder to break out of pernicious polarization once it arises, because there is no other choice for voters who fear the other party.”90 A winner-take-all electoral system can therefore make escalating polarization more difficult to escape. Voters—if they choose to vote at all—are perpetually left with only two viable options: to support one’s own party or to defect to the other team.91 Most choose to remain with their side, further entrenching binary conflict.92

By contrast, in contexts where rules of party formation are open and accessible, proportional representation generates multiparty systems in which coalitions tend to form and change over time. The coalitional implications of multipartyism can “defuse partisan hostility,” as one group of researchers found.93 That is, in a multiparty landscape, those of different partisan affiliations are more likely to work together and to change with whom they work over time; in turn, partisans are more likely to learn to get along. Different coalitions can form to govern together—or simply to work on particular issues together. Moreover, even after coalitions dissipate, “warm affective evaluations linger long after.”94 By generating multiparty systems, proportional systems are associated with less severe degrees of affective polarization.

This relationship may have other impor­tant implications for democratic health. For example, proportional systems are associated with lower levels of political violence globally compared with winner-take-all.95 Electoral losers also have greater levels of trust in their democratic institutions in proportional systems than those in winner-take-all. And proportional systems may be more likely to encourage “losers’ consent”—the acceptance of losing an election and conferring legitimacy upon the winners.96 Indeed, proportional representation typically results in far fewer actual “losers” in any election and a greater likelihood of securing some representation, as well as influence in government, even for those in the minority.97

Generally, cross-national evidence appears to support electoral system scholar Arend Lijphart’s conclusion that proportional systems produce a “kinder, gentler” politics.98 Political scientist Jennifer McCoy cautions that “changing the electoral system alone will not guarantee a more harmonious state of political affairs”—but, nonetheless, she concludes, “changing it is likely to help.”99
 

Governance

Predicting the impact that STV or any other new electoral system might have on governance in the United States is an inherently difficult task for a range of reasons.

Proportional systems internationally tend to be multiparty systems. This variety gives voters more specific options when picking representatives, but it rarely leads to a majority in the legislature. As a result, party leaders usually form a governing coalition after the election, combining issue positions into a workable government. This is unfamiliar in the United States, and extrapolating from cross-national results to the American context requires some imagination.

Moreover, comparing countries can tell us that proportional systems on average perform better than, or as well as, winner-take-all systems on many key governance metrics, but “on average” masks considerable variation. Among the more proportional democracies, for example, are some cautionary tales (Italy and Israel frequently come to mind; few electoral system experts would recommend these countries’ distinct approaches to proportional representation).100 The specific design choices made by policymakers (especially with regard to district magnitude) matter immensely.101

Would electoral system reform in the United Sates encourage more and different parties, which would then open up the space and energy for more creative coalitions that could unlock more innovative approaches to solving some of our current governance gridlock? Certainly, it is possible. On balance, comparative research finds that proportional systems perform better across a wide range of policy dimensions related to good governance.

On balance, more proportional systems provide

• better public health outcomes, across a number of measures;102
• lower levels of economic inequality;103
• higher satisfaction with democracy;104 and
• higher levels of subjective well-being.105

Generally, scholars who document these correlations argue that these outcomes arise because proportional systems provide more precise representation across the ideological and issue spectrum, thus better representing the entire population, including traditionally marginalized groups. Proportional systems also appear to make longer-term investments in public goods, because policymaking is more incremental under coalition governments. In addition, multiparty democracies (which, again, proportional systems tend to be) perform slightly better on the World Bank’s measure of effective governance.106

But details matter immensely.107 Additionally, and beyond electoral engineering, certain best practices for governing could increase the likelihood of success should Congress choose to transition to a more proportional electoral system, and these demand further study.108

Proportional Representation and Presidentialism 

Proportional representation and presidentialism were once viewed as incompatible, with scholars cautioning that fragmented party systems could lead to legislative gridlock and democratic breakdowns.109 However, recent empirical evidence suggests that proportional systems and presidentialism can work effectively together under the right conditions.110 

Presidents in multiparty systems typically build coalitions through cabinet appointments and policy concessions.111 These coalitions may form before elections or emerge after election results are known. In general, pre-electoral coalitions provide more stable governments internationally; that is, coalitions that are less likely to break up prior to elections.112 Coalition-building mechanisms, including pork-barrel politics and portfolio allocation, help facilitate cooperation between the executive and legislature, preventing deadlock.113 

The success of proportional representation–presidential combinations is contingent on specific conditions. Moderate multiparty­ism, characterized by a limited number of parties and a balance between executive and legislative powers, tends to foster stability.114 Excessive party fragmentation, however, can create difficulties in coalition-building and governance.115 Strong institutions, including checks on executive power, are also essential to prevent presidential overreach.116 Moderate multipartyism encourages negotiation and compromise, often producing more centrist and stable governance outcomes.117 Thus, the success of combining proportional representation with presidentialism relies heavily on thoughtful institutional design.118 

Summing up the recent literature in a 2023 paper, political scientists Scott Mainwaring and Lee Drutman write, “For well over a decade now, the growing conventional wisdom has been that presidentialism and PR [proportional representation] can work well together. The newer literature has shown that coalitional presidentialism, in which the president’s party shares power with others through cabinet appointments and other mechanisms, is a common and perfectly viable institutional combination.”119